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REDISTRICTING FOR THE PURPOSE OF REPRESENTATION
JAMEs E. PATE*

The conclusions reached in the Federal Convention's discussiojln of representation were crystalized in Article I of the
Constitution as follows: "The House of Representatives shall
be composed of members chosen every second year by the people
of the several States........ Par. (3) of the same section reads:
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states which may be included within this
. The
Union, according to their respective numbers .......
actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the
first meeting of the Congress of-the United States, and within
every subsequent. term of ten years, in such manner as they shall
by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed
one for every 30,000, but each State shall have at least one representative." 2 In Article I, sec. 4, par. (1) we find that: "The
* Prof. of Political Science, College of William and Mary. B. A.,
Louisiana College; M. A., Virginia; Ph. D. Johns Hopkins; contributor
to various periodicals.
1 Farrand's Records of Federal Convention.
For references to discussions of representation see: Vol. I, pp.
36, 48, 49, 52, 57, 134, 151, 154, 559, 587;
Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 122, 123, 203, 217, 235, 268;
Ibid. Vol. III, pp. 311, 319, 260.
2There was some fear, at first, that the House of Representatives
would be too small or that the number of its members would not be
increased with the progress of population. In a striking passage
(Federalist No. 58) Madison comments on this point as follows:
"One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this
subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very sVrious attention, it
is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact
direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous
an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater
is known to be the ascendancy of passion over reason. In the
next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities.
Now, it is precisely on characters of this description that the
eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their
force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the
people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a
sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle,
the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered,
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times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of ch oosing senators. "1
The second Congress, October 1791, took up the question of
apportioning representatives among the several States. A bill
recognizing fractions in the apportionment of representatives
to the States passed finally both Houses of Congress. "The
result," comments John Marshall, "was a more equitable apportionment of representatives to population, but the rule was
novel and overturned opinions which had been generally assumed, and were supposed to be settled." 3
Divergence of opinion as to constitutionality of the apportionment act developed in the President's Cabinet. Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, believed the act constitutionally correct. Mr. Jefferson, the Secretary of State, believed
the act invalid because the Constitution had not provided for
use of fractions left from "the operation". He advised the
President that it was a good time to use the executive veto.
"The non-use of his negative," Jefferson says, "begins already
to excite belief that no President will ever venture to use it;
and it can never be used more pleasingly to the public than in
the protection of the Constitution. " 4 On this occasion President Washington accepted his Secretary of State's advice, even
to the extent of using the veto message which Jefferson in his
the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective
meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and
passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can
never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier
against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purloses of safety, of local information,andof diffusive
sympaathy withk the whole society, they will counteract their own
views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance
of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that
animates it will be more oligarchic., The machine will be enlarged,
but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by
which its motions are directed." For further Federalist discussion of House of Representatives, see Federalist Nos. 52 to 60 inclusive.
';See Marshall's Life of Washington, V, 318-24, Philadelphia 1807.
The Writings of Jefferson (Ford's Edition) V, p. 500, N. Y. 1895.
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methodical way had drafted.5 "Thus," observes Marshall,
"was this interesting part of the American Constitution finally
settled."
Until 1842 fractions were, therefore, rejected in apportioning representatives after each decennial census. Webster's criticism of the act of 1832, and his strong support for a plan to
represent large fractions" led to our first experiment in the representation of fractions in the apportionment act of 1842. In
this act an additional representative was allowed a State when
the remainder left from dividing its population by the electoral
quotient was over one-half of the quotient. From 1850 through
1900 Congress distributed seats in the House of Representatives
according to the Vinton Plan, whereby any undistributed seats
went to those States with the largest fraction.
This discussion about fractions in our reapportionment
acts was bound to attract the attention of mathematicians and
statisticians. This happened about 1910, and since that time
we have the following methods of apportionment:
Method
Method
Harvard.
Method
.Method
Method

of Major Fractions, devised by Prof. Willcox of Cornell.
of Equal Proportions, discovered by Prof. Huntington, of
of Smallest Divisors.
of Greatest Divisors.
of Harmonic Mean.'

Decided differences of opinion have developed as to these
plans. In his presidential address before the American Economic Association, Professor Willcox states that: "The method of
major fractions is the correct and constitutional method of apportionment." 8 On the other hand Professor Huntington has
an able defender in Professor Chafee who believes that the
method of equal proportions is the best plan from both the
a
mathematical and political standpoint.
Professor Willcox's plan of major fractions was used in
5Compare Marshall op. cit. V, 324 and Jefferson op. cit. V, 501.
a Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster (National Ed.) XIV, p.
144, Boston, 1903. Webster's dictum is seen in recent cases in defense
of inequality of congressional districts.
' For an able discussion of, these various plans of apportionment,
see CongressionalReapportionment,by Zechariah Chafee, Harvard Law
Review, 42-1015 (1929). Professor Huntington comments on the
mathematical phase of the problem in American Political Science
Review, November 1931, p. 961.
sAmerican Economic Review, VI, March, 1916.
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1911; but in 1920 Congress skipped, making no reapportionment at all in that year, the first time that such a thing was
done in the history of the Republic. In 1929 an act was passed
to prevent anything like this recurring again. Future reapportionment after the decennial census is now guaranteed. If Congress fails to act, an appotionmient worked out in the Census
Bureau on the basis of the formula used in the last preceding
apportionment goes into effect. An opportunity to use the new
law was presented in 1930 when Congress loath apparently to
increase the size of the House beyond four hundred thirty-five
members or to apportion at this number with consequent loss
of representatives to some states, adjourned without taking any
action on the matter.
A further historical retrospect is needed to appreciate the
recent cases that have been before the courts. From 1791 to
1842 Congress was concerned largely in fixing the number of
representatives for each State. In 1842 there appears, for the
first time, in an Act of Congress the statement that representatives shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of representatives to which
each State is entitled. In the act following the census of 1850,
the reference to districts was omitted. In 1862 districts were
again mentioned; and in 1872 we find the further provision that
such districts should contain as nearly as practicable an equal
number of inhabitants. This provision was found in each decennial apportionment act from 1872 to 1911. In 1929 this injunction of compactness, of contiguity, and of equality in population of districts was left out of the law.
The apportionment act which went into force automatically
in 1930 resulted in a gain of twenty-seven seats distributed
among eleven States and a loss of representatives to twentyone States. The thirty-two States affected by this act, proceeded to draw new districts for representation in the House of
Representatives. In doing this there was full evidence of the
practice of an old art.9
OFor interesting account of origin and early use of gerrymander,
see "The Political Depravity of the Fathers" by McMaster (Atlantic
Monthly, May 1845) "It is to Massachusetts," writes McMaster, "that
we owe the introduction of the most infamous piece of party machinery this country has produced. . . . In 1812 the Jeffersonian
Republicans overcame Federalist strongholds by joining them to Re-
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Several interesting questions have been raised by these
recent State redistricting acts:
1. Does the act of Congress enjoin equality of districts?
2. Does the Constitution contemplate districts of equal population?
3. Has Congress the power to redistrict?
4. Is redistricting for representation in the Hrouse of Representatives an exercise of the legislative power in which the governor
participates by his veto?
5. Are redistricting acts subject to referendum when provided
- in State constitutions for ordinary legislative acts?

The first question propounded above has been answered by
the state courts, by the United States District Courts and finally
by the United States Supreme Court.
By the redistricting act of 1931, the Illinois legislature divided the State into twenty-seven districts with populations that
varied from 158,738 to 511,785 in the district in which Cook
County is located. An attempt was made by means of a taxpayer's bill to enjoin the spending of public money to carry out
provisions of the act on the ground that it violated the Act of
Congress (1911) which required that representatives to the lower
House of Congress shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous, compact territory, and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. On the other hand the
defendant secretary of state maintained that the Act of 1929
repealed that of 1911; and, therefore, in absence of congressional legislation, the States are empowered to elect their representatives in any manner they choose, even without regard to
compactness, contiguity, or equal population in the districts.
In answering this question, the Illinois Supreme Court held
the State redistricting act invalid because it violated the requirement of the Act of Congress (1911) which was not superseded by the Act of 1929. Furthermore, the court declared, if
there were no congressional enactment on the subject, the legislative act is invalid because the Illinois Constitution provides
that all. elections shall be free and equal: And an election is
free "when the voter is exposed to no intimidation or improper influence and is allowed to cast his ballot as his own conpublican strongholds. They cut Worcester County in two, joined
Bristol and Norfolk, attached some of the towns of Suffolk to those of
Essex and in the next General Court had twenty-nine Senators out of
forty." For recent cases of inequalities of representation see Mott,
Materials on American Government, D. 219.
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science dictates; and an election is equal when the vote of each
voter is equal in its influence upon the result to the vote of
every other voter". 1 0
A similar situation developed in Virginia when the General
Assembly 1 in endeavoring to accommodate her congressional districts to the loss of one representative so shifted the lines of
three districts that a single district was made to contain approxnmately one-fourth of the entire area and one-seventh of the
population of the whole State. Dr. W. M. Brown filed a petition
for mandamus praying that the Secretary of State be compelled
to receive notice of candidates at large for Congress on the
ground that there were no congressional districts in Virginia because the redistricting act was contrary both to the Act of Congress (1911) and to the Virginia Constitution.
For over one hundred years the principle of practical equality of representative districts has been in the Virginia Constitution. Basing its decision on this provision of the State Constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared the redistricting act invalid because no bona fide effort was made to
divide the State into districts containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. 12 And for the first time
in one hundred forty-four years, Virginia's entire membership
in the House of Representatives had to run at large.
Under the apportionment act, Kentucky's representation
in the lower House of Congress was reduced from eleven to nine.
The State's redistricting law was brought into question by one
who sought relief both as a taxpayer and as a legally qualified
I"Moran v. Bowley, 179 N. E. 526 (1932).
"Acts of Assembly, Virginia .1932 c. 23.
'-Brown v. Saunders, 166 S. E. 105 (1932).
Some variation in size of districts as nointed out by the Court,
is inevitable due to the Virginia custom of not breaking county lines
in creating congressional districts. "From the early history of Virginia," the Court said, "the community of interests in the counties has
been recognized and in no division of State for any governmental purpose has any county line been broken."
The Attorney General emphasized the dictum in the early Virginia
case of Wise v. Bigger (79 Va. 269) where the Supreme Court of Appeals had said: "The laying off and the defining of congressional districts is the exercise of a political and discretionary power of the
legislature, for which they are amenable to the people whose representatives they are." The principal point in this case, however, was
not constitutionality of the act creating the ten congressional districts
in substance, but whether the bill had been passed according to proper
procedure.
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congressional elector. In establishing its jurisdiction, the Federal District Court held this was a proper case brought by a
legal voter and "it is well settled," the court said, "that the
right to vote is a valuable right capable of being measured in
money". The Court held that the Kentucky redistricting act
violated the law of Congress (1911) both as to uniformity, as
to compactness and as to equality of population. "Instead of
complying with the law," the court said, "the legislature without any reason whatever other than exigencies of practical politics, worked out a gross inequality of population between the
districts, and not only did 'the legislature disregard requirement
of substantial equality of population but the fifth district outrageously violates the requirement of compactness of territory
its shape resembling a French style telephone.'"'3
.....
Following the passage of Mississippi's redistricting act
(1932), an attempt was made to get a writ of mandamus to
compel the Secretary of State to disregard in making up ballots
any designations of candidates for Congress by districts and to
prepare ballots only for candidates at large, on the ground that
the Mississippi act violated the provision of the Act of Congress (1911) requiring equality. The Supreme Court of Mississippi passed only on the merits of the mandamus and refused
to issue*the writ because the public interest would be adversely
affected. Since primary ballots were involved, the court felt
obliged to declare: "Courts have no jurisdiction to direct how
party authorities shall act in administration of party machinery
under primary election statutes; moreover, federal statutes have
nothing to do with party primaries and party nominations
within a State."
The Court went out of its way in showing clearly how it
stood on the question of elections by districts versus elections
at large. Representation by districts, the Court says, is a century old practice and there have been inequalities in districts
from the beginning. An election . at large is undesirable
(1) because "it is important that the representation in the
lower House of Congress in this day and time ......
.shall
be by districts where each section has a representative familiar
with habits, desires, aspirations and problems of his people;
"Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. (2d) 142 (Sep. 1932).
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(2) a state-wide struggle in present condition of economic distress would introduce strife, turmoil and bitterness, and the
people of Mississippi have been wearily hoping to be permitted
to remain a while in political peace.' 14
The Mississippi redistricting act was declared invalid by
the United States District Court because of conflict with the
equality provision of the Act of Congress (1911).15
An appeal from the United States District Court carried to
the United States Supreme Court finally the question whsther
Congress requires States in redistricting for the House of Representatives to observe the requirepments of compactness, contiguity and equality of population.
The Supreme Courtanswered this question in the negative. The omission in the
Act of 1929 of the above requirements, the Court says, was deliberate. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, says
further: "'There is no ground for conclusion that the Act of
1929 re-enacted or made applicable to new districts the requirements of Act of 1911 as to compactness, contiguity, and equality in population of districts. They did not outlast the apportionment to which they related.''16
This decision of the Supreme Court has been as disquieting
to those who fear some irreparable injury to democratic principles, as the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Hern.
don and Nixon v. Condon.17 have been disquieting to those who
live under the spectre of negro domination of democratic primaries in the south. Both fears are unfounded.
But it has raised the question: Does not the Constitution
contemplate districts of an equal number of inhabitants for the
purpose of representation in the House of Representatives?
And does not Congress have the power to redistrict, if necessary, to attain this end?
21Wood v. State, 142 So. 747. (July 1932).
25Broom v. Wood 1 F. (2d) 134 (Sept. 1932). IneqUalities in Mississippi Congressional districts ranged from 184,000 to 414,000; 40% of
the population was in one district.
2 Wood v. Broom. 53 Sup. Ct. R. 1 (Oct. 1932).
The Attorney
General of Virginia appeared in this case as amici curiae. The Kentucky case, mentioned above, reached the United States Supreme Court
December 1932, in Mahan v. Hume, 53 SuD. Ct. R. 223. The decree
of the United States District Court was reversed. See Mississippi case
for Court's opinion.
'Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); q ixon v. 47ondon, 52
S. Ct. 484.

K. L. J.-6
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As these questions have not been adjudicated, it becomes a
mere matter of opinion. By a great stretch of the legal imagination, the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which reads
"representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed"
has been taken to enjoin congressional districts of an equal number of inhabitants. Professor Bowman, writing in the :Nihigan
Law Review,18 believes that it would not be at all fanciful or
"unreasonable to spell out of the Fourteenth Amendment a
duty of State -authorities to apportion so as to confer equality of
representation". If this, however, is part of a national plan to
give fluidity to the Constitution who would gainsay it in times
like these ?
But suppose the States obstinately persist to redistrict in
equal proportions? In a case like this, can Congress step in and
redistrict the State?
There is no doubt as to the source of Congress' power to
control congressional elections. We find it stated in Art. I,
See. 4 of the Constitution as follows: "The times, places and
manner of holding elections for senators and representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators". There
are divergent views as to how far this power goes. In favor of
a broad extension of congressional authority over the subject we
have such an expression from the Court (Smiley v. Holmes,
supra) that: "In exercising this power, the Congress may
supplement these State regulations or may substitute its own.
It may impose additional penalties for the violation of the State
laws or provide independent sanctions. It has a general supervisory power over the whole subject."
In 1870 Congress, for the first time, exercised in a broad
manner its control over congressional elections. 19 In upholding these acts of Congress, the Supreme Court in ex parte
Siebold speaks in part as follows: "There is no declaration that
1'8
Bowman, N. M., CongressionalRedistricting and the Constitution.
Mich. Law Review, December 1932, p. 167.
19Sixteen Stat. at Large 256. Seventeen Stat. at Large 347. See
Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, II, 639.
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the regulations shall be made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by Congress. If Congress does not interfere, of
course they may be made wholly by the State; but if it chooses
to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its doing
so, either wholly or partially. On the contrary, their necessary
implication is that it may do either. It may either make the
regulations, or it may alter them. If it only alters, leaving, as
manifest convenience requires, the general organization of the
polls to the State, there results a necessary cooperation of the
two governments in regulating the subject. But no repugnance
in the system of regulations can arise thence; for the power of
Congress over the subject is paramount. It may be exercised as
and when Congress sees fit to exercise it. When exercised, the
action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the
regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them. This is
implied in the power 'to make or alter.' "20
On the other hand Justice Field's dissenting opinion in this
case is certainly more consistent with"the view of the Fathers
as expressed in the Federalist.21 -In commenting on that part
of the Constitution coming after the semicolon, quoted above,
Justice Field says: "The act was designed simply to give the
General Government the means of its preservation against a
possible dissolution from the hostility of the States to the election of representatives, or from their neglect to provide suitable
means for holding such elections." "I am greatly mistaken,"
writes Hamilton in the Federalist, "if there be any article in
the whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition; that
every government ought to contain in itself, the means of its
own preservation. "
As an authority on this question, the Virginia case (Brown
v. Saunders, supra) cites the congressional election committee's
report in the contested election case of Davidson v. Gilbert,
which in part reads: "So far as legislative declaration is concerned, it is apparent that Congress has expressed an opinion
"Ex parte Siebold-100 U. S. 371 (1879); cf. Willoughby (supra),
p. 641.
See Federalist, No. LIX.
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in favor of its power to require that the States shall be divided
into districts composed of contiguous territory, and of as nearly
equal population as practicable. Whether it has the constitutional right to enact such legislation is a very serious question
and the uniform current of opinion is that if it has such power
under the Constitution, that power ought never to be exercised
to the extent of declaring a right to divide the State into congressional districts or to supervise or change any districting
which the State may provide." In other words, as one writer
has put it, it is better to have state gerrymanders than a congressional gerrymander.
The second question, mentioned above: Is congressional redistricting by the State legislature an exercise of the ordinary
law making power in which the governor participates?
This question came up in Minnesota when as a result of
a recent congressional apportionment act, Minnesota's representatives, as Virginia's, were reduced from ten to nine. In the State
redistricting act, Minnesota's strong third party, the Farmer
Laborite, was discrninated against in what the Minnesota
Journal describes as "the rankest gerrymander ever conceived
by a Minnesota legislature". Governor Olsen, a Farmer Laborite, vetoed the bill. An appeal from a lower court carried
three questions to the State Supreme Court, namely: (1) Does
the congressional apportionment act of 1929 repeal the act of
1911? (2) Is the State redistricting act contrary to the privilege
and immunity clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, inasmuch
as two voters in one district have the same voting power as three
in another!, and (3) What is the law making power in regard to
congressional redistricting? The Court answered the first question in the affirmative. As to the second question, the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated because
(by Minor v. Heppersett, 21 Wall. 171) the right to vote for
representatives is not a necessary incident of federal citizenship.
In its answer to the third question, the Court reasoned as
follows: The Federal Constitution provides that the time,
place and manner of holding elections in each State shall be
prescribed by the legislature. The Minnesota Constitution defines the legislature as consisting of the Senate and House of
Representatives, i. e., it is the representative body which makes
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the State laws and does not consist of the governmental machinery which constitutes the State's law-making power. Redistricting, therefore, is a legislative function in which the governor
does not participate by his veto. In making a congressional
apportionment, the Court says, the State legislature acts exclusively as an agency responding to a federal mandate, 22and not
in discharge of legislative duties of a law making body.
A similar question was brought before the State courts in
Missouri and New York. In the latter State, redistricting was
by a joint resolution which was not submitted for the governor's
approval. The New York court held the joint resolution redistricting the State ineffective because this must be done by
the law making power which includes the governor. 23 A similar
-view was taken by the Missouri court where an attempt to disregard the governor's veto was thwarted when the court held
in which
that congressional redistricting was a legislative act
2 4
the governor may participate by interposing a veto.
These cases 25 were carried to the United States Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari. The Court's opinion in each case
was written by Chief Justice Hughes. The principal opinion
is found in Smiley v. Holm.
The primary question before the Court, "Whether the function contemplated by Art. I, See. 4 is that of making law", was
answered in the affirmative. We find, the Court says, no suggestion in Art. I, See. 4 of the Federal Constitution of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact
laws in any matter other than that in which a constitution of
the State had provided that laws shall be enacted. Whether the
governor shall participate by his veto in redistricting the State
for congressional elections just as in the making of other State
laws is a matter of State policy. In defining legislative functions,
the Chief Justice says: "The legislature may act as an electoral
body. It may act as a ratifying body, as in the case of a proposed amendment to the Constitution;" and further, it means
today what it meant when the Constitution was adopted: "A
'State v. Holm, 238 N. W. 494 (October 1931).
OKoenig v. Flynn. 179 N. E. 705 (February 1932).
2S

tate ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S. W. (2d) 533.

s Smiley v. Holm, 52 S. Ct. 397 (March 16, 1932); Carrollv. Becker,
02 S. Ct. 402 (March 24, 1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 52 S. Ct. 403 (March
24, 1932).
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legislature was then the representative body which made the
laws for the people."
One of the results of the Supreme Court's decision was
that New York's two additional representatives were elected at
large, but in the case of Missouri and Minnesota where there was
a reduction of representation the entire lot of congressional candidates were forced to seek election from the State at large.
Neither political party in Missouri viewed this situation with
complacency because of the increased cost of the election campaign with the possibility of the election of all representatives
from the largest cities, and because of the disruption of party
machinery. The result in Minnesota was an unprecedented
scramble for nomination, eighty-eight candidates entering the
lists. When the battle cleared, the people of Minnesota were
chagrined to find that one of the successful candidates had served
26
a term in a federal prison.
A further analysis of the State's law making power was
made by the courts in connection with the question: Is the
referendum a part of the .State's legislative power in the sense
that it can be applied to congressional redistricting acts?
The Supreme Court of California has held that a redistricting act is subject to referendum.. 27 In an early case 28 on this
subject, the Supreme Court of South Dakota declared that the
word "legislature" as used in Art. I, See. 4 of the United States
Constitution does not mean simply the members who compose
the legislature but refers to the law making power of the State,
as established by the State Constitution, which in South Dakota
under the referendum includes the people and therefore a congressional redistricting act is subject to popular referendum.
In 1915 an Ohio redistricting act was, according to a referendum provision of the State Constitution, submitted to the
people and rejected. The State Supreme Court held that the
action of the people had nullified the act since the provision for
25For interesting account of these elections see:
R. V. Shumate, Minnesota's Congressional Elections at Large,
American Political Science Review, February, 1933.
L. M. Short, Congressional Redistricting in Missouri, American
Political Science Review, August, 1931.
2'Boggs v. Jordan, 267 Pac. 696 (1928).
S,9tate ex rel. Shrader v. Polzy, 12 N. W. 848 (1910).
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referendum was part of the legislative power.2 9 This decision
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice
White, speaking for the court, says: Congress by providing in
the Reapportionment Act of 1911 that the redistricting of congressional districts should be made by each State "in the manner provided by the laws thereof" plainly intended that if by
the State Constitution the referendum is treated as part of
the legislative power it is applicable for the purpose of creating
congressional districts. The contention that the congressional
act is unconstitutional because it impliedly recognizes the referendum, the Chief Justice says, rests upon the assumption that
to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power
is to introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect
annihilates representative government and therefore violates the
constitutional provision requiring a republican form of government. This, the Chief Justice says, on the basis of Pacific
States Telegraph and Telephone Company v. Oregon (223 U. S.
118), offers no justiciable question.30
When we turn our attention to a brief review of reapportionment for representation in State legislatures, problems similar to those discussed above are seen. There exists in some of
these legislative districts the grossest inequalities, which, as
Governor Pollard recently told the Virginia General Assembly,
"can be easily corrected if political expediency and personal
political fortunes be disregarded." "And loyalty to the principle of representative government," the Governor goes on to
say, "requires an honest effort to reduce to a minimum the inequalities growing out of differences in population between districts."
In Virginia inequalities exist between rural districts as
well as between urban and rural districts. Isle of Wight
County, for instance, with a population of 13,409 and, as for
2 State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 94 Ohio 154 (April, 1916).
"Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916). For comments on this
case see 18 Michigan Law Review 51 (1919). Davis v. Hildebrant is,
of course, to be distinguished from Hawke v. Smith, 253, U. S. 221
(1920) where the Supreme Court held that the referendum could not
be applied to the ratification of an amendment to the Federal Constitution. "It is true," the Court says, "that the power to legislate in the
enactment of the laws of a State is derived from the people of the
State. But the power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution."
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that matter, a half dozen other counties with a similar population are each represented by one delegate, while Accomae
County with twice this population has only one delegate, and
Norfolk and Wise Counties with over three times the population
of Isle of Wight have only two representatives each in
the House of Delegates. A delegate from the City of Norfolk
represents three times as many people as the delegates from several rural counties, and he represents approximately twice as
many people as the delegates from the majority of the rural
counties of the State.
In the Virginia Senate there is Halifax County with a population of 41,283 represented by a single senator, while Norfolk
County, a larger county, is grouped with the cities of South
Norfolk and Portsmouth to make a single senatorial district of
83,643. A Norfolk city senator represents 87,000 people. Each.
of the Richmond senators represents approximately 63,000 people. In sharp contrast to this is Amherst and Nelson Counties
which are combined to form a single senatorial district of 37,900 people. 31
Compared with legislative districts in several other States,
the Virginia districts are models of equality. In Connecticut,
which is an extreme case, New Haven with a population of 162,537 has two representatives in the lower house of the legislature,
32
while Union Village has two representatives for 257 people.
The reason for this great inequality in Connecticut and
Virginia is because each town or city is given equal representa
tion regardless of population. Other reasons for this situation
in other States are the respect for county lines, party conflict,
and urban-rural jealousy.
State constitutions usually require for representation 4n
State legislatures, as for representation in Congress, that distriets shall be compact, contiguous, and as nearly as practicable,
equal in number of inhabitants. Some State constitutions as
the Virginia Constitution require only a reapportionment every
ten years. But the mere requirement for decennial reapportionments strongly implies that the maintenance of equality is the
motive.
3"See the writer's State Government in Virginia, (Richmond 1932)
Ch. 4.

See Mot. op. cit. p. 225.
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The State legislature, therefore, is the apportioning authority. The question arises as to the extent of legislative discretion
in the performance of this important duty. Some courts have
favored the exercise of wide discretion, while others have narrowly restricted legislative discretion. In an early New York
case, 33 it was held that the constitutional expression 'as nearly
as may be' allows the exercise of legislative discretion and
courts should not interfere unless it appears that it has been
plainly and grossly abused. In other words, equality as between
legislative districts is a matter of legislative integrity.
In an early Illinois case 34 holding valid the apportionment
act (1843) of that State, the court says: "In imposing this duty
on so numerous a body as the General Assembly, the people must
be presumed to have contemplated that the two houses composed of men from all parts of the State, representing different
and often conflicting interests and views, would have much difficulty in securing fair results; and that only an approximation
towards absolute equality in representation could be secured."
On the other hand, we see a different point of view expressed
in a Michigan case 5 where the court denied the right of a
scrupulous legislature to dismember a county in forming representative districts "as near as may be" equal in population. In
attaining this desirable end the court believed that the State
Constitution did not contemplate a division of counties. "If
one county can be dismembered," the Court says, "all of them
can; and we might have, under the exercise of legislative discretion, a representation ignoring counties altogether, and based
solely upon the idea of equality of population." A still
stronger stand against the exercise of legislative discretion is
seen in two Wisconsin cases. 3 6 In the former case the court
says, "Constitutional restrictions on legislative power of making
apportionment are mandatory and imperative and are not subject to legislative discretion. In the latter case the Wisconsin
Supreme Court declares that a constitutional requirement for
apportionment according to number of inhabitants is plain and
hence not to be regarded as abrogated by legislative violations.
"People ex rel Carter v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473 (1892).
"'People v. ThQmpson, 40 N. E. 307 (1895).
"Board of Supervisors v. Blacker, 52 N. W. 951 (1892).
State v. Cunningham, 51 N. W. 724 (1892)'; State ex rel. Lamb v.
Cunninghm, 53 N. W. 35 (1892).
36
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But if the legislature abuses its legislative discretion or if
it refuses altogether to reapportion representatives, the question immediately arises: Can pressure be brought to compel
legislative compliance with the constitution?
This question has been answered recently in several interesting cases in Illinois where no apportionment has been made
since 1911 and the controversy between Chicago and rural Illinois for the control of the State legislature has been particularly acute. In Fergus v. Marks3 7 the petitioner for a writ of
mandamus to compel the legislature to meet and to apportion
the State contended that the duty imposed by the Illinois Constitution is clear and mandatory, and that the right set up by the
petition is the "right of representation which by the Declaration
of Independence is said to be a right estimable to the people and
formidable only to tyrants". The court denied the writ, saying
in part: "The duty to reapportion State is a specific legislative
duty imposed by the Constitution solely upon the legislative
department of the State, and it alone is responsible to people for
failure to perform that duty."
Two years later an Illinois taxpayer sought by injunction
to stop payment of salaries to legislators on the ground that the
legislature was not a legal body since no new apportionment
had been made for over ten years thus violating the State Constitution and the guarantee of the republican form of government clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court denied the
petition holding that, it could not be denial of salaries do indirectly what it could not do directly. "Apart from a constitutional amendment", the Court says, "the people have no remedy.
save to elect a General Assembly which will perform that
duty. "3
Two years later the Illinois Supreme Court refused a quo
warranto to be used to test the validity of a member's right to
serve from one of the existing legislative districts on the ground
that the General Assembly had no de jure existence because of
failure to apportion. The Court reiterated its former opinion
that the legislature could not directly or indirectly be compelled
by court action to reapportion. 39
-'152 N. E. 557 (1926).
3"'ergus v. Kinney, 164 N. E. 665 (1928).

2'Fergus v. Blackwell, 173 N. E. 750 (1930).
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The attack upon the legislature took another angle in
People v. Claridy4 ° where the plaintiff, a citizen of Chicago, was
sentenced to prison for six months for carrying concealed
weapons. He contended that the Illinois statute under which he
had been convicted was unconstitutional because failure to reapportion since 1911 made the General Assembly an illegal body.
This contention was rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court,
the Court asserting that it had no authority to declare the General Assembly not a de jure body.
41
An interesting line of attack is seen in Keoqh v. Neeley
where the plaintiff in a bill for an injunction against the United
States Collector of Internal Revenue contended that the United
States Government had ceased to have authority to levy and
collect federal income taxes from the citizens of Illinois because
the Federal Government had not compelled the Illinois legislature to redistrict the State and thereby secure for the State
equal representation and therefore the republican form of government guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The
Illinois Supreme Court held this contention entirely without
merit. The court went on to say: "Even were the Federal
Government empowered to force a State to obey its State Constitution as to reapportionment and failed to do so, this failure
would not relieve citizens of the State from duties and burdens
imposed by the Federal Constitution. If this were not so, the
citizen while still remaining in the country, might with impunity set at naught the Federal Constitution and laws and virtually secede from the government. This cannot be, sanctioned
especially since the stirring events of 1861-65."
The solution of this problem, therefore, seems to lie in establishing a non-legislative body to reapportion the State along
equitable lines. Some Commonwealths have had experience in
doing this. In Ohio, for instance, the governor, auditor and
secretary of state make apportionments regularly after each
decennial census. The result of this plan has been to avoid the
glaring discriminations seen in some States where the legislature has been derelict in its duty. 42 In Maryland it is the duty
"165 N. E. 638 (1929).
50 F. (2d) 685 (1931).
See Proceduresin state LegisZative Apportionment by V. 0. Key,
American Political Science Review, Dec. 1932.
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of the governor to arrange according to constitutional rules
representation in the House of Delegates after each federal census. A constitutional amendment in Florida provides that in
case the legislature fails to apportion at the time specified, the
governor shall after adjournment of the session call a special
session to consider the question of reapportionment; and such
session is required to reapportion the representation as required
and such extra session shall not be linnited to expire at the end
.of twenty days or at all until reapportionment is effected and
shall consider no business other than such reapportionment. In
Missouri, provision is made for the governor, secretary of state,
and attorney-general to divide the State into senatorial districts, "as nearly equal in population as may be," if the General Assembly fails to do this at the first session following the
census. Passing on this provision in 1912, the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that the governor and his associates in carrying
out this apportionment duty were a minature legislature, and
consequently . .. could no more be compelled by mandamus to
43
redistrict the State than the legislature proper could be."
If equitable apportionment for representation is to be guaranteed we should (1) exclude the governor from the non-legislafive body and (2) have a specific constitutional amendment
definitely make the apportioning authority amenable to mandamus. As a final guarantee, the popular initiative could be used.
In Washington State, for example, the voters by using the initiative were able (1930) to adopt a statute reapportioning both
houses of the lgisldture for the first time since 1901, and remedied a situation in which great inequalities of representa44
tion prevailed.
A brief summary of the problem of redistricting for the
purpose of representation in Congress shows that: (1) There
is no act of Congress today wbch enjoins congressional districts
of equal population; (2) The Federal Constitution does not
43 State ex reZ. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S. W. 40 (1912).
In State v.
Becker, 235 S. W. 1017 (1921) it was held that the initiative and referendum, adopted in 1908, had nullified the constitutional provision giving the legislative power of making apportionments to the governor
and his associates.
"V. o. iey op. cit. p. 1058. An effort was made to block the
initiative but the State Supreme Court held this device proper for attaining the objective of reapportionment. Miller v. Hinkle, 286 Pac.
839 (1980).
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require congressional districts of an equal number of inhabitants, and only by a wide stretch of the imagination can such a
requirement be read into the Constitution; (3) A liberal construction of Congress' power in Art. I, Sec. 4, might possibly include a right to redistrict, still it would be unwise for the Congress to brush aside a State and on its own account redistrict the
State into congressional districts; (4) Redistricting is an exercise
of the ordinary law-making power in which the governor may
participate by his veto; (5) Redistricting acts are subject to the
referendum when this is provided in a State constitution for ordinary legislative acts.
As to reapportionment for the purpose of representation in
State legislatures we find that: (1) The legislature may ignore
a State constitutional provision requiring them to reapportion
the State into districts that are contiguous and, as nearly practicable, equal in population; (2) A State legislature cannot be
compelled either directly or indirectly to comply with the constitution's requirements; (3) As a result of the foregoing, some
States in order to secure compliance with the constitution have
provided for reapportionment by a non-legislative body, or by
popular initiative; and, (4) in order to make sure of (3) supra
it will be necessary to provide in the State constitution for the
writ of mandamus to be used against the apportioning authority
in case of failure to carry out its duty.
Representatives thus elected by popular vote from districts
that are contiguous, compact and, as nearly as practicable, equal
in inhabitants will probably be amenable to the popular.will and
the spirit of representative government, at least in the American
45
sense, will be observed.

4 See J. S. Mill Representative Government, particularly Chs. 5
and 12, and Edmund Burke for a classic dissent to the above view.
Burke once remarked: "The representative should be a pillar of State,

not a weathercock on the top gf the edifice exalted for his levity and
versatility and of no use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashion-

able gale."

